Summary
The radio spectrum i s a scarce resource, and s o c i e t y ' s c o n c e r n s i n managing i t a r e , i n p r i n c i p l e , no d i f f e r e n t t h a n i n managing o t h e r scarce resources. These basic concerns are (1) r a t i o n i n g , (2) conservation and ( 3 ) c o n t r o l o f e x t e r n a l e f f e c t s , s u c h a s i n t e r f e r e n c e . T h e r e a r e two decision-making institutions which society can u s e i n managing the spectrum: government and market. Spectrum lnanagement by government, the present approach, delegates decision-making to a small group of appointed officials and addresses t h e t h r e e b a s i c i s s u e s t h r o u g h r e g u l a t i o n a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s , s u c h a s b l o c k a l l o c a t i o n , t e c h n i c a l s t a n d a r d s a n d c o m p a r a t i v e hearings. Spectrum management by market would d e l e g a t e d e c i s i o n making t o a large nunber of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s h o l d e r s ; p r i c e would become t h e p r i n c i p a l r a t i o n i n g f o r c e a n d would c r e a t e i n c e n t i v e s f o r v o l u n t a r y c o n s e r v a t i o n ; a n d i n t e r f e r e n c e would be controlled by enforcement of property rights.
The n e c e s s a r y a n d s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r the establishment of a market in spectrum i s a system of t r a n s f e r a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s .
A simple system of property rights could be instituted by a l l o w i n g f o r t h e f r e e t r a n s f e r of spectrun assignments a s d e f i n e d u n d e r e x i s t i n g l i c e n s e s .
A more f l e x i b l e a n d e f f i c i e n t p r o p e r t y r i g h t c o u l d be created by transforming existing frequency a s s i g n m e n t s , w h i c h a r e d e f i n e d b y r e s t r i c t i o n s on system inputs, to a set o f o u t p u t r i g h t s which s t i p u l a t e p e r m i s s i b l e l e v e l s o f r a d i a t i o n a c r o s s frequency and geographical boundaries. Other s t e p s which could be taken to improve the functioning of a spectrum market include reducing o r e l i m i n a t i n g b l o c k a l l o c a t i o n d i s t i n c t i o n between services and permitting re-negotiation of r i g h t s p c k a g e s among a s s i g n e e s .
I n t r o d u c t i o n
A number of proposals have been given i n c r e a s e d a t t e n t i o n r e c e n t l y f o r c h a n g i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m y t h a t we have a l l o c a t e d a n d managed t h e r a d i o s p e c t r u n f o r n e a r l y 50 years. Such proposals, variously called spectrun economics, spectrun deregulation or spectrum markets, a l l have one t h i n g i n comaon: a s h i f t of decision making authority over the use of the spectrun from Government t o p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s .
S t a t e d a n o t h e r way, t h e s e new proposals, such a s band assignment, a u c t i o n s , t r a n s f e r a b l e l i c e n s e s , e t c . , would, i f adopted, move t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e m a r k e t p l a c e f o r t h e Government a s t h e b a s i c d e c i s i o r u m k i n g i n s t i t u t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g how and by whom t h e spectrun resource is used i n t h i s c o u n t r y .
* The views expressed are those of the author and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t t h e v i e w s o f t h e Commission.
While these ideas seem c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t a y we manage other scarce resources and with the c u r r e n t mood of the country to dlminish Government p r e s e n c e i n o u r p r i v a t e l i v e s , t h e r e i s a g r e a t u n e a s i n e s s i n t h e r a d i o i n d u s t r y a s t o h o w t h e s e new approaches to spectrum management may a f f e c t t h e i r b u s i n e s s . It i s human r a t u r e t o resist major changes in long established social i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t t h e c o n c e r n s a n d f e a r s o v e r these proposals seem unusually intense. Some of t h i s c o n c e r n may stem from a lack of understanding of how a s p e c t r m m a r k e t would f u n c t i o n , how i t would d e a l w i t h t h e i s s u e s , a n d how i t would r e p l a c e t h e v o l m e s o f s p e c t r m r e l a t e d r u l e s which have been painstakingly developed over the years.
But a l l of these rules, our block a l l o c a t i o n p l a n , equipment t e c h n i c a l s t a n d a r d s , i n t e r f e r e n c e c r i t e r i a , f r e q u e n c y c o o r d i n a t i o n procedures, channel loading standards and others, were developed i n r e s p o n s e t o s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t o r y concerns. This paper attempts to define more c l e a r l y w h a t t h e s e basic concerns are in spectrum management and to compare how those concerns are addressed under the present regulatory system v e r s u s how they might be addressed by a spectrum market.
It a l s o s u g g e s t s a p o t e n t i a l l y f e a s i b l e a p p r o a c h t o d e f i n i n g e n f o r c e a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i n spectrum based on calculated rather than measured r a d i a t i o n l e v e l s , a n d sets f o r t h a p o s s i b l e t r a n s i t i o n s c e n e r i o f o r t h e o r d e r l y evolution of spectrun markets a s a replacement for Federal regula tion.
The Easic Issues in Spectrun Wmgement
I n i t s broadest sense spectrun management i s t h e management by society of one of i t s s c a r c e resources: the radio spectrun.
The spectrun i s a resource consuned in the production of telecommunication services.
It i s consumed in t h e sense that each and every radio system, to o p e r a t e , r e q u i r e s e x c l u s i v e a c c e s s t o some f i n i t e qllantity of the spectrum.
While we a r e continuously developing techniques to reduce the amount of spectrum consuned by radio systems, so f a r we hsve not been able to operate two r a d i o systems on exactly coincident frequencies, a t t h e same instants of time and with electrouagnetic f i e l d s o r i e n t e d p r e c i s e l y w i t h i n the same g e o g r a p h i c a l s p c e .
The spectrun is, a s i n d i c a t e d , n o t o n l y a r e s o u r c e b u t a l s o s c a r c e . That i s , absent any c o n s t r a i n t s on i t s u s e , t h e r e would not be enough of it t o s a t i s f y a l l demands. I n o t h e r words, i f t h e s p e c t r m were f r e e a n d t h e r e were no r u l e s which r e s t r i c t e d who could use i t , how much they could use and for what purposes, some p o t e n t i a l u s e r s c o u l d n o t b e s a t i s f i e d . This is more t r u e , of course, in certain bands, geographical areas and periods of time t h a n o t h e r s , which i s only to s a y that spectrun in not uniformly scarce.
But it c e r t a i n l y seems i n t u i t i v e l y o b v i o u s t h a t i n a t least t h e uajor c i t i e s , t h e most u s e f u l p o r t i o n s of the spectrun can be considered scarce, a c c o r d i n g t o a n y r e a s o n a b l e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t term.
I f i t i s t r u e that the spectrun is a s c a r c e resource, then there are c e r t a i n a y s s o c i e t y c a n o r g a n i z e i t s use of it t o i n c r e a s e t h e b e n e f i t i t d e r i v e s from tbe spectrum. The f i r s t t h i n g society can do is t o p r i o r i t i z e i t s use of the spectrum and ensure that those uses of greatest v a l u e are met. I n o t h e r words the spectrun, being scarce, can be rationed to obtain increased value. Secondly, since those uses which must be excluded presumbly have some p o t e n t i a l v a l u e t o society, efforts should be taken to reduce the amount of spectrun c o n s m d by each use which i s s a t i s f i e d so t h a t a d d i t i o n a l u s e s c a n b e accomnodated.
I n o t h e r words the spectrun should be conserved.
F i n a l l y , a s i n o t h e r r e s o u r c e s , t h e w y o n e u s e r c h o o s e s t o u s e t h e s p e c t r m c a n e f f e c t o t h e r u s e r s
i n e i t h e r d e s i r a b l e o r u n d e s i r a b l e w y s . These a r e g e n e r a l l y r e f e r r e d t o a s e x t e r n a l e f f e c t s . I n t e r f e r e n c e i s a n example of a familiar n e g a t i v e e x t e r n a l e f f e c t of spectrun use. On t h e other hand, a p o s i t i v e e x t e r n a l e f f e c t c a n r e s u l t , f o r example, fran econanies of scale i f many i n d i v i d u a l s p e c t r u n u s e r s s e l e c t a common e q u i p e n t design.
Also, i n some a p p l i c a t i o n s t h e s e l e c t i o n of common frequencies by individual u s e r s c a n i n c r e a s e v a l u e t o o t h e r s
by providing a greater nunber of p o t e n t i a l communication p o i n t s .
Thus, s o c i e t y c a n i n c r e a s e t h e b e n e f i t s i t d e r i v e s from the spectrun by devising a y s t o reduce negative external effects and increase p o s i t i v e e f f e c t s .
T h i s ,
t h e n , d e f i n e s t h e t h r e e b a s i c i s s u e s which any spectrum management i n s t i t u t i o n must a d d r e s s :
(1) r a t i o n i n g , ( 2 ) coneemation and ( 3 ) c o n t r o l o f e x t e r n a l i t i e s .
Now l e t ' s look a t the w y t h e s e i s s u e s a r e resolved under the present system in which Govermuent i s the basic decisionmaking i n s t i t u t i o n a n d compare that with how t h e y might be addressed by a spectrua market.
Spectrum bhnagement by Government
Under the present system of spectrun management, p r a c t i c a l l y a l l decisions regarding c i v i l i a n s p e c t r u n u s e a r e = d e by t h e F e d e r a l Government, namely the FCC. The basic decisionmaking v e h i c l e i s the public rulemaking proceeding, which provides the opportunity for i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s t o e x p r e s s t h e i r v i e w s t o t h e r e g u l a t o r y a g e n c y b e f o r e a n y f i n a l rules a r e adopted. Decisions are made by a majority vote of seven politically appointed Conmissioners guided b y t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t mandate of t h e Communications Act.
These regulatory decisions governing the spectrun are r e f l e c t e d i n the Commission's Rules and Regulations.
While t h e y f i l l m n y v o l u n e s , t h e s e rules can be grouped into six basic c a t e g o r i e s :
(1) ITU r e g u l a t i o n s which a l l o c a t e t h e s p e c t r u n by bands t o b r o a d c a t e g o r i e s of use (e.g., mobile, broadcasting, fixed, etc.); ( 2 ) FCC/NTIA a g r e e n e n t s which divide the spectrum between Government and non-Government users; ( 3 ) FCC band a l l o c a t i o n s t o more narrowly define categories of use (e.g., land mobile, paging, mobile telephone, dispatch, etc.); ( 4 ) FCC band a l l o c a t i o n s t o g r o u p s o f non-Goverument u s e r s ( e . g . , c o m o n c a r r i e r , e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , p u b l i c s a f e t y a g e n c i e s , a m a t e u r s , c i t i z e n s , b u s i n e s s e s , e t c . ) ;
(5) FCC standards on e q u i p e n t and systems design (e.g., power, antenna height, modulation type, trunking, frequency tolerance, occupied bandwidth, spurious emission, etc.) and 
o n is addressed through the rules on e q u i p e n t a n d system design and by channel loading criteria w h i c h , t o g e t h e r , d e t e r m i n e f a i r l y p r e c i s e l y how much spectrun w i l l be consumed by a given use, e.g., 25 kHz for one voice channel, 6 M H z f o r one video channel, etc.). Interference (negative e x t e r n a l e f f e c t ) i s c o n t r o l l e d a l s o b y i m p o s i q equipment standards, coupled with rules which p r e s c r i b e how c l o s e t o g e t h e r ( i n t i m e , f r e q u e n c y and space) users must o p e r a t e w i t h i n t h e s p e c t r u n .
O t h e r , p o s i t i v e e x t e r n a l e f f e c t s , s u c h a s economies of scale a n d i n t e r o p e r a b i l i t y , a r e achieved both through natiorml and international band allocations (e.g., worldwide maritime bands) and through system technical standards (e.g., c o m p a t i b l e m o b i l e u n i t s f o r c e l l u l a r s e r v i c e ) .
Spectrm Mnagement by Market
While not often thought of a s such, a market i s a s much a formal, decision-making institution a s is Government.
W e need only look a t m a r k e t s i n o t h e r s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s , s u c h a s l a n d , t o s e e t h a t they are, i n f a c t , h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d , e f f i c i e n t decision-making institutions.
The u n d e r l y i n g b a s i s of any resource market i s a system of c l e a r l y d e f i n e d , t r a n s f e r a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s . This i s fundamental. Without use rights which can be bought and sold, markets in spectrun or any resource cannot exist.
The buying and selling of s u c h p r o p e r t y r i g h t s by i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e creates a p r i c e s t r u c t u r e f o r t h e r e s o u r c e w h i c h , i n t u r n , becomes a s u b s t i t u t e f o r G o v e r m e n t r e g u l a t i o n .
For example, as a r e s u l t of t h e c r e a t i o n o f p r i c e , t h e s p e c t r u n r e s o u r c e would a u t a n a t i c a l l y b e a t i o n e d 
g . , g a s o l i n e ) . I n t e r f e r e n c e i n a spectrun market would b e c o n t r o l l e d by enforcement of property r i g h t s . S i n c e i n t e r f e r e n c e would b e t h e v i o l a t i o n by one user of a n o t h e r u s e r ' s p r o p e r t y r i g h t i t could be remedied in the courts (or by some o t h e r a r b i t e r ) i n much t h e Same f a s h i o n a s a r e infringements of
land use rights. Positive e x t e r n a l i t i e s s u c h a s economies of scale o r i n t e r o p e r a b i l i t y of equipment could be provided through voluntary coordination, in which existing o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u c h a s u s e r g r o u p s , i n d u s t r y associations or even individual manufacturers could play an important role.
A Government agency could also perform such a coordination function, p a r t i c u l a r l y when i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s is involved.
D e f i n i n g P r o p e r t y R i g h t s i n t h e S p e c t r m Since, a s i n d i c a t e d , t h e c r e a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i s fundamental to
a market approach to spectrun lilanagement, l e t ' s spend a few minutes delving a b i t d e e p e r i n t o t h i s s u b j e c t .
Any spectrun rights package would, of n e c e s s i t y , i n c l u d e s o n e d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e q u a n t i t y a n d l o c a t i o n o f t h e s p e c t r u n r e s o u r c e being assigned. I t i s this aspect of spectrum p r o p e r t y r i g h t s that seems t o c a u s e t h e g r e a t e s t concern for technical people.
Same ' , who have s t u d i e d a n d w r i t t e n o n t h i s q u e s t i o n , seem to have concluded tbat the problem i s unsolvable, i.e., that we can never quantify a package of spectrun use r i g h t s which o f f e r s the h o l d e r a n y s i g n i f i c a n t degree of freedom without incurring prohibitive enforcement costs.
The d i f f i c u l t y i s not in defining boundaries
i n the spectrun. Certainly we can draw l i n e s on maps which precisely define geographical areas, and we draw l i n e s on frequency charts which p r e c i s e l y d e f i n e a band, and we can block out and How can i t prove that the suspected intruder is producing e n e r g y l e v e l s w i t h i n h i s p r o p e r t y , e i t h e r a c
Such ambiguity can be reduced by taking many measurements a t d i f f e r e n t locations and times and averaging. But the high cost of making nunerous measurements could prohibit prosecution of any except the most troublesome interference cases.
A high enforcement cost would reduce the value of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t a n d l e a d t o i n e f f i c i e n t u s e o f t h e resource.
Suppose, however, the property rights package defined an infringement based on c a l c u l a t e d r a t h e r than measured values.
To prove a v i o l a t i o n , a l l one would need do i s enter the parameters of a s u s p e c t e d o f f e n d i f g s t a t i o n i n t o a standard mathematical model and the umber produced by the c a l c u l a t i o n would determine whether there z s s a l e g a l v i o l a t i o n o r n o t . C o n v e r s e l y , e a c h r i g h t s holder would have a simple, uniform means of determining how i t s o m systan i s constrained by i t s o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s o f a d j a c e n t property holders.
Under such a system, determining infringements could be simple and unambiguous with a l m o s t n o t h i n g l e f t t o l i t i g a t i o n . The c a l c u l a t i o n model would be specified in advance and agreed to by the rights holder a s a condition of grant.
The g r a n t e e c o u l d a l s o b e made t o a g r e e to publicize system inforaation which would be needed i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n model to determine whether it i s v i o l a t i n g someone e l s e ' s p r o p e r t y r i g h t s .
About the o n l y l i t i g a t i o n p o s s i b l e i n such a system of r i g h t s would be Over t h e v a l i d i t y of the info-tion supplied.
However, v e r i f i c a t i o n s h o u l d b e r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w r d b y o n -s i t e i n s p e c t i o n o f f a c i l i t i e s , i f r e q u i r e d .
Some may a r g u e t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h would result i n i n e f f i c i e n c i e s due t o l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e p r e c i s i o n of the model or models used for c a l c u l a t i o n s . While it would b e d e s i r a b l e t o h a v e a model which corresponded perfectly to the real world enviroment, there w i l l a l m y s b e some d e g r e e o f e r r o r i n a n y model. This imprecision t r a n s l a t e s i n t o a n u n c e r t a i n t y f o r t h e r i g h t s holder, i.e., the electromagnetic energy falling within a given property from other users may be more o r less t h a n t h a t p r e d i c t e d by t h e model. While t h i s would not result i n l i t i g a t i o n , s i n c e t h e c a l c u l a t e d f i g u r e would be binding, it would create a d e g r e e o f i n t e r f e r e n c e r i s k which would h a v e t o b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t i n t h e d e s i g n o f systems. But t h i s i s no d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e r i s k that e x i s t s under the present system of assigment which i s also based on c a l c u l a t i o n .
The main d i f f e r e n c e i s i n who manages t h i s r i s k , Government o r p r i v a t e p a r t i e s .
T r a n s i t i o n from Government to Egrket Spectrun Egnagement
Another potential area of concern about the c r e a t i o n of spectrum markets l i e s i n how t h e t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s m i g h t b e managed.
How might a system of spectrun property rights be instituted without massive displacements of existing users? Of c o u r s e , t h e r e a r e many p o s s i b l e w y s t o p r o c e e d t o implement spectrun markets.
However, p o s s i b i l y the only feasible approach would be one which p r e s e r v e s t h e p r e s e n t e q u i t i e s i n t h e s p e c t r u n . This could be done by converting existing spectrum a s s i g n m e n t s i n t o t r a n s f e r a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t s .
The simplest "ay to create a p r o p e r t y r i g h t from a present assignment would b e t o e l i m i n a t e r u l e s which restrict f r e e t r a n s f e r , i.e., r e p e a l a n t i t r a f f i c k i n g rules.
This would a l l o w a n e x i s t i n g l i c e n s e e who may be making only marginal use of his assignment to s e l l it. It would a l s o a l l o w someone who may believe he can do a b e t t e r job of using that c h a n n e l t o t r y o u t h i s i d e a s i n the marketplace, whereas now h i s e n t r y may be t o t a l l y b l o c k e d b e c a u s e a l l c t a n n e l s a r e assigned. Both the seller and the buyer benefit, o r else the sale would not take place, and chances are s o c i e t y would b e n e f i t from a higher valued use of that piece of spectrun. While the public may have given up one service of marginal value, it w i l l q u i t e l i k e l y h a v e g a i n e d a new service of g r e a t e r v a l u e . Also, since the new entrepreneur w i l l t a v e p a i d f o r h i s r i g h t t o that c t a n n e l , he w i l l have a strong incentive to use i t e f f i c i e n t l y .
It s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t , d u r i n g t h i s i n i t i a l t r a n s i t i o n t o a spectrum market, the spectrum r i g h t s p a c k a g e need not be changed from that a s defined today under FCC l i c e n s e s . The only necessary regulatory change would be the l e g a l i z a t i o n o f t r a n s f e r . The assignment could remain subject to the same r e s t r i c t i o n s a s a t present including that i t be used only for the type of services presently permitted.
While t h i s would create a market of sorts, it would be a rather rudimentary one.
To i n c r e a s e t h e e f f i c i e n c y o f t h e m a r k e t , r e g u l a t i o n s on the use of the spectrun might be removed o r made less r e s t r i c t i v e . P e r h a p s t h e n e x t s t e p i n that direction might be a r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y r i g h t from one based on i n p u t r e s t r i c t i o n s , a s are present a s s i g n m e n t s , t o one based on output effects, a s discussed in the preceding section. Present rights packages are d e f i n e d i n terms of r e s t r i c t i o n on equipment and system design and operation.
Thus, we have r u l e s on power e x e r c i s e more care i n how they re-defined their rights packages.
A t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s t h e spectrun market would be functioning a t very near i t s rnaximum e f f i c i e n c y a n d t h e r o l e o f Government m u l d have been reduced to a minimum. Government would most l i k e l y s t i l l be involved in negotiating spectrun use agreements with other countries, in managing the Federal Government's own s h a r e o f t h e r e s o u r c e , i n c o o r d i n a t i n g worldwide o r m t i o n w i d e common f r e q u e n c i e s o r s t a n d a r d s f o r s p e c i a l u s e s requiring such commonality, and in collecting and disseminating information to assist t h e o p e r a t i o n of the market. But it would no longer be the p r i n c i p a l i n s t i t u t i o n f o r lnanaging the spectrun. That function would have been transferred almost e n t i r e l y t o t h e m a r k e t .
Decision-making a u t h o r i t y over the spectrum would no l o n g e r b e v e s t e d i n seven Commissioners but rather be distributed among t h e m u l t i t u d e of spectrun property holders.
Conclusions
The a u t h o r ' s c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h i s l i m i t e d a n a l y s i s , w h i c h d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t t h e views of his employer, are
(1) that a market could b e a n e f f e c t i v e , d i s c i p l i n e d s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n f o r managing t h e r a d i o s p e c t r u n , i n much t h e same m y i t manages o t h e r s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s ; ( 2 ) t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n o f a system of flexible spectrun property rights which can be enforced a t r e a s o m b l e c o s t a p p e a r s t o b e a solvable problem; and ( 3 ) t h a t t r a n s i t i o n from the present system of spectrum management t o a spectrun market could be a c c o m p l i s h e d i n a n o r d e r l y , e q u i t a b l e manner without rmjor displacement of existing users or d i s r u p t i o n o f services. The p u r p o s e o f t h i s p p e r is simply to show t h a t t h e r e is a c h o i c e t o b e made.
